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Self and Self-Representation - Audio

Professor Christopher Peacocke, UCL and Columbia U

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Self and Self-Representation - Audio
Self and Self-Representation - Audio

Self and Self-Representation - Audio

Professor Christopher Peacocke, UCL and Columbia U

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Self and Self-Representation - Audio

Latest Episodes

Self-Consciousness - Audio

Professor Christopher Peacocke (UCL and Columbia University) discusses ways in which notions of self-consciousness go beyond the forms of first person representation discussed in the first three lectures in this series. He distinguishes, and characterizes, two varieties of self-consciousness, which he calls perspectival and reflective self-consciousness. He discusses the epistemological and metaphysical significance of these notions, their relations to one another, and their relevance to topics ranging from the characterization of animalsâ representations of themselves to the understanding of self-consciousness in both continental and Anglophone philosophers.

40 MIN2011 FEB 7
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Self-Consciousness - Audio

Descartes Defended - Audio

Professor Christopher Peacocke (UCL and Columbia University) applies the theory of the first person and of conscious subjects developed in the earlier lectures in this series in defence of some famous theses of Descartes, including his argument Cogito ergo Sum. Peacocke also considers Bernard Williamsâ assessment of Descartes on these issues, and the correct response to Lichtenbergâs complaint that Descartes should have said merely âThinking is occurringâ. In the final part of the lecture, Peacocke deploys the theory of the first two lectures to answer some of Kantâs famous objections to what he called ârational psychologyâ.

46 MIN2011 FEB 7
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Descartes Defended - Audio

Subjects of Consciousness, their Nature and our First Person Thought - Audio

Professor Christopher Peacocke (UCL and Columbia University) further develops the theory of subjects of consciousness outlined in Lecture One in this series, and applies the results against reductionist conceptions of subjects, and against Daniel Dennettâs view of subjects as centres of narrative gravity. He treats the first person concept I like other concepts, as individuated by its fundamental rule of reference. He individuates the first person concept in part by its relations to a more fundamental nonconceptual first person notion.

51 MIN2011 FEB 7
Comments
Subjects of Consciousness, their Nature and our First Person Thought - Audio

Latest Episodes

Self-Consciousness - Audio

Professor Christopher Peacocke (UCL and Columbia University) discusses ways in which notions of self-consciousness go beyond the forms of first person representation discussed in the first three lectures in this series. He distinguishes, and characterizes, two varieties of self-consciousness, which he calls perspectival and reflective self-consciousness. He discusses the epistemological and metaphysical significance of these notions, their relations to one another, and their relevance to topics ranging from the characterization of animalsâ representations of themselves to the understanding of self-consciousness in both continental and Anglophone philosophers.

40 MIN2011 FEB 7
Comments
Self-Consciousness - Audio

Descartes Defended - Audio

Professor Christopher Peacocke (UCL and Columbia University) applies the theory of the first person and of conscious subjects developed in the earlier lectures in this series in defence of some famous theses of Descartes, including his argument Cogito ergo Sum. Peacocke also considers Bernard Williamsâ assessment of Descartes on these issues, and the correct response to Lichtenbergâs complaint that Descartes should have said merely âThinking is occurringâ. In the final part of the lecture, Peacocke deploys the theory of the first two lectures to answer some of Kantâs famous objections to what he called ârational psychologyâ.

46 MIN2011 FEB 7
Comments
Descartes Defended - Audio

Subjects of Consciousness, their Nature and our First Person Thought - Audio

Professor Christopher Peacocke (UCL and Columbia University) further develops the theory of subjects of consciousness outlined in Lecture One in this series, and applies the results against reductionist conceptions of subjects, and against Daniel Dennettâs view of subjects as centres of narrative gravity. He treats the first person concept I like other concepts, as individuated by its fundamental rule of reference. He individuates the first person concept in part by its relations to a more fundamental nonconceptual first person notion.

51 MIN2011 FEB 7
Comments
Subjects of Consciousness, their Nature and our First Person Thought - Audio

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