title

SCOTUScast

The Federalist Society

3
Followers
22
Plays
SCOTUScast

SCOTUScast

The Federalist Society

3
Followers
22
Plays
OVERVIEWEPISODESYOU MAY ALSO LIKE

Details

About Us

SCOTUScast is a project of the Federalist Society for Law & Public Policy Studies. This audio broadcast series provides expert commentary on U.S. Supreme Court cases as they are argued and issued. The Federalist Society takes no position on particular legal or public policy issues; all expressions of opinion are those of the speaker. We hope these broadcasts, like all of our programming, will serve to stimulate discussion and further exchange regarding important current legal issues. View our entire SCOTUScast archive at http://www.federalistsociety.org/SCOTUScast

Latest Episodes

Peter v. NantKwest Inc. Post-Decision SCOTUScast

On Dec 11, 2019 the Supreme Court decided Peter v. NantKwest Inc., a case considering whether a party opting to bring a challenge in federal district court to an adverse decision of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office’s (PTO) Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) must pay the PTO’s resulting attorney’s fees. When a patent applicant is rejected by the PTO, and the PTAB affirms that decision on appeal, the aggrieved applicant may either pursue further (but relatively constrained) review in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit--or the applicant may file a more expansive challenge in federal district court. The latter option is authorized by 35 U.S.C. § 145, but the statute also provides that “[a]ll the expenses of the proceedings shall be paid by the applicant.”Here, NantKwest challenged an adverse PTAB decision in federal district court, but lost. After the judgment was affirmed by the Federal Circuit, the PTO sought reimbursement of its expenses from NantKwest, inc...

16 MIN2 w ago
Comments
Peter v. NantKwest Inc. Post-Decision SCOTUScast

Monasky v. Taglieri - Post-Argument SCOTUScast

On Dec. 11, 2019, the U.S. Supreme Court heard argument in Monasky v. Taglieri, a case involving the standard of appellate review applicable to determinations of “habitual residence” under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, as well as the conditions under which habitual residence is established for an infant.The Hague Convention, and the federal law that implements it in the United States, indicate that a parent whose child has been removed to another country in violation of that parent’s custodial rights can petition in federal or state court for the return of the child to the child’s country of habitual residence. The courts of that country can then resolve any underlying custody disputes. Petitioner Michelle Monasky, an American, gave birth to her daughter A.M.T. in Italy. Monasky’s husband Domenico Taglieri, who is the father, is Italian. Alleging that Taglieri had become physically abusive, Monasky took the newborn A.M.T. to a domes...

8 MIN2 w ago
Comments
Monasky v. Taglieri - Post-Argument SCOTUScast

Intel Corp. Investment Policy Committee v. Sulyma - Post-Argument SCOTUScast

On Dec. 4, 2019, the U.S. Supreme Court heard argument in Intel Corp. Investment Policy Committee v. Sulyma, a case asking what degree of knowledge of a possible violation is necessary to trigger the three-year statute of limitations provided in the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).Respondent Christopher Sulyma worked for Intel Corporation from 2010-12, and during that time participated in retirement plans governed by ERISA. In 2015, Sulyma brought suit against Intel’s investment policy committee under various provisions of ERISA, alleging that the committee had invested imprudently and failed to make certain disclosures. Intel moved to dismiss the complaint based on ERISA’s statute of limitations, which provides that actions like Sulyma’s may not be commenced more than “three years after the earliest date on which the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the breach or violation.” The district court found that Sulyma had actual knowledge of the alleged violations more than three years before bringing suit, and dismissed the case. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, concluding that Sulyma’s constructive knowledge of the alleged violations did not rise to the level of “actual knowledge” necessary to trigger the statute of limitations. It was not sufficient, the Court determined, that the relevant facts were available to the Sulyma; he had actually to be aware of those facts.The Ninth Circuit’s reasoning on the meaning of “actual knowledge” conflicted with that of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, however, and the Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari to consider whether the ERISA limitations provision bars suit when all the relevant information was disclosed to the plaintiff by the defendants more than three years before the plaintiff filed the complaint, but the plaintiff chose not to read or could not recall having read the information.To discuss the cases, we have Matthew S. Rozen, Associate Attorney at Gibson DunnAs always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.

16 MIN3 w ago
Comments
Intel Corp. Investment Policy Committee v. Sulyma - Post-Argument SCOTUScast

Barton v. Barr Post Argument SCOTUScast

On Nov. 4, 2019, the U.S. Supreme Court heard argument in Barton v. Barr, a case involving a dispute over whether, for the purposes of the “stop-time rule,” a lawfully admitted permanent resident who is not seeking admission to the United States can be “render[ed] ... inadmissible”. The stop-time rule affects the discretion afforded the U.S. Attorney General to cancel the removal from the United States of a lawful permanent resident who has resided in the U.S. continuously for 7 years. Under the stop-time rule, the requisite continuous residence terminates once the alien commits any of a certain number of offenses that render the alien inadmissible to (or removable from) the United States under federal law. Thus, committing a listed offense may cause an alien to fall short of the continuous 7-year residence requirement and thereby become ineligible for cancellation of removal.Andre Martello Barton, after receiving lawful permanent resident status, was convicted in 1996 on three counts of aggravated assault, one count of criminal damage to property, and one count of firearm possession during the commission of a felony, all in violation of state law. In 2007 and 2008, he was also convicted of several state law drug offenses. The federal government then initiated proceedings to remove Barton based on his various convictions. He conceded removability on the basis of his controlled substance and gun possession offenses but applied for cancellation of removal based on continuous residence. The government argued that Barton’s 1996 convictions triggered the stop-time rule, thereby disqualifying him for cancellation of removal. The Immigration Judge ruled in favor of the government and the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. Barton then petitioned for relief from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, which rejected his argument that the stop-time rule only applies to aliens seeking admission to the United States, and therefore denied his petition.The Eleventh Circuit recognized that the federal circuit courts of appeals have split on the issue, however, and the Supreme Court ultimately granted certiorari to address whether a lawfully admitted permanent resident who is not seeking admission to the United States can be “render[ed] ... inadmissible” for the purposes of the stop-time rule.To discuss the case, we have Amy Moore, Associate Professor of Law at Belmont University College of Law.As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.

12 MINJAN 27
Comments
Barton v. Barr Post Argument SCOTUScast

Kansas v. Garcia - Post-Argument SCOTUScast

On Oct. 16, 2019, the U.S. Supreme Court heard argument in Kansas v. Garcia, a case involving a dispute over whether the federal Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) precludes states from using any information contained in a federal Form I-9, (which includes common information such as name, date of birth, and social security number) to prosecute the person with a state crime.Respondents Ramiro Garcia, Donaldo Morales, and Guadalupe Ochoa-Lara were convicted of identity theft (and/or making a false information) by the state of Kansas, for using social security numbers that were not theirs on federally required employment or housing-related paperwork. Respondents argued that their convictions were invalid on the grounds that IRCA preempts the use of such information in a state prosecution. The Kansas Supreme Court agreed and reversed the convictions, holding that IRCA expressly preempted state prosecutions that use information contained in a federal I-9 form. That decision conflicted with those of various other state supreme courts and federal circuit courts of appeals, however, and the U.S. Supreme Court subsequently granted Kansas’s certiorari petition to address whether IRCA impliedly preempts Kansas’ prosecution of respondents.To discuss the cases, we have Jonathan Urick senior counsel for litigation at the U.S. Chamber Litigation Center.As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.

27 MINJAN 10
Comments
Kansas v. Garcia - Post-Argument SCOTUScast

Allen v. Cooper - Post-Argument SCOTUScast

On Nov. 5, 2019, the U.S. Supreme Court heard argument in Allen v. Cooper, which involves a dispute over the way state sovereign immunity and federal copyright law interact when an author alleges state infringement of that author’s federal copyright.Petitioner Frederick Allen and his company, Nautilus Productions, contend that North Carolina violated their federal copyrights by publishing video and photographic footage that Allen had taken of the pirate Blackbeard’s sunken flagship, Queen Anne’s Revenge. Allen also challenges the validity of a recently passed North Carolina statute providing that photographs and video recordings of shipwrecks in the custody of North Carolina are public records. This law, he contends, was enacted in bad faith to undermine his copyright claim.Allen and Nautilus sued North Carolina and various of its officials in federal district court. Although the district court rejected defendants’ invocation of sovereign immunity from suit, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed that judgment, concluding that the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act does not validly abrogate Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity, which ultimately shields respondents from all of Allen’s and Nautilus’s claims.The U.S. Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari to consider whether Congress validly abrogated state sovereign immunity via the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act in providing remedies for authors of original expression whose federal copyrights are infringed by states.To discuss the case, in this special panel episode, we have Zvi Rosen, Visiting Scholar and Professorial Lecturer in Law, George Washington University School of Law, Prof. Josh Blackman, Associate Professor of Law, South Texas College of Law Houston, and our moderator, Kevin R. Amer, Deputy General Counsel at the U.S. Copyright Office.As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.

41 MIN2019 NOV 23
Comments
Allen v. Cooper - Post-Argument SCOTUScast

County of Maui, Hawaii v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund - Post-Argument SCOTUScast

On Nov 6, 2019, the U.S. Supreme Court heard County of Maui, Hawai’i v. Hawai’i Wildlife Fund, which involves a dispute over whether the Clean Water Act’s permit requirement applies when pollutants originate from a concrete point but are only conveyed to navigable waters indirectly, via groundwater.Under the federal Clean Water Act (CWA), someone seeking to discharge a pollutant from a “point source,” such as a pipe or well, into navigable water must first obtain a permit via the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System program (NPDES). The County of Maui, Hawai’i (the County), owns and operates four wells at a wastewater treatment plant that processes several million gallons of sewage per day. Treated wastewater from the plant is injected into groundwater via these wells, and some ultimately enter the Pacific Ocean via submarine seeps.Hawai’i Wildlife Fund and various other organizations filed suit against the County, alleging that it was violating the CWA by discharging effluent through groundwater into the ocean without an NDPES permit. The district court agreed with the plaintiffs and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, rejecting the County’s argument that no violation occurred because the pollutants did not issue directly from the point source (the wells) into navigable water (the ocean), but rather traveled indirectly to the ocean via groundwater. The Ninth Circuit’s reading sharpened a split among the federal circuit courts of appeals on the proper interpretation of the CWA, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to address whether the CWA requires a permit “when pollutants originate from a point source but are conveyed to navigable waters by a nonpoint source, such as groundwater.” To discuss the cases, we have Glenn Roper, attorney at the Pacific Legal Foundation.As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.

26 MIN2019 NOV 14
Comments
County of Maui, Hawaii v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund - Post-Argument SCOTUScast

Kansas v. Glover - Post-Argument SCOTUScast

On Nov. 4, 2019, the U.S. Supreme Court heard argument in Kansas v. Glover, a case involving a dispute over the “reasonable suspicion” necessary to justify a traffic stop when the registered owner of a vehicle has a revoked license but the actual driver of the vehicle has not been identified.A county sheriff’s deputy pulled over Charles Glover, Jr. after running a registration check on the vehicle Glover was driving and finding that the registered owner had a revoked license. Although Glover was, in fact, the registered owner, the deputy did not attempt to confirm his identity before making the stop; nor did he witness any traffic violations. The deputy had simply assumed the registered owner was the person driving the vehicle. Glover moved to suppress evidence obtained during the traffic stop, arguing that the officer had lacked the requisite “reasonable suspicion” of illegal activity to authorize the stop. The Kansas Supreme Court ultimately agreed with Glover, holding that the officer “lacked an articulable and reasonable suspicion that the unidentified driver did not have a valid driver's license.” This decision conflicted with those of various other state supreme courts and federal circuit courts of appeals on similar questions, and the U.S. Supreme Court subsequently granted Kansas’s certiorari petition to consider whether, for purposes of an investigative stop under the Fourth Amendment, it is reasonable for an officer to suspect that the registered owner of a vehicle is the one driving the vehicle absent any information to the contrary.To discuss the cases, we have Brian Fish, Special Assistant, United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland.As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.

20 MIN2019 NOV 13
Comments
Kansas v. Glover - Post-Argument SCOTUScast

Mathena v. Malvo - Post-Argument SCOTUScast

On October 16, 2019, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Mathena v. Malvo, a case which concerns the scope of a new constitutional rule when applied retroactively on collateral review.In 2004, respondent Lee Boyd Malvo was convicted in Virginia on various counts of capital murder due to his participation in the “DC Sniper” attacks of 2002. As he was 17 years old at the time, he avoided the death penalty and was sentenced to four terms of life imprisonment without parole. In 2012, the Supreme Court held in Miller v. Alabama that sentencing a person younger than 18 to mandatory life imprisonment without parole violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments. In 2016, the Court then held in Montgomery v. Louisiana that Miller had announced a new substantive rule applicable retroactively in cases on state collateral review.When Malvo raised these issues on collateral review, the Fourth Circuit held that his sentences of life without parole must be va...

11 MIN2019 NOV 2
Comments
Mathena v. Malvo - Post-Argument SCOTUScast

Sexual Orientation Consolidated - Post-Argument SCOTUScast

On October 8, 2019, the U.S. Supreme Court heard argument in two consolidated cases asking whether discrimination “because of … sex,” which is prohibited by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, includes discrimination based on sexual orientation.In Altitude Express, Inc. v. Zarda, gay skydiving instructor Donald Zarda was fired after a female client with whom he was preparing a tandem jump alleged that he had touched her inappropriately, though he had disclosed his sexual orientation to protest that his intentions were not sexual. His lawsuit alleged that his employer discriminated against him because he was honest about his sexual orientation and did not conform to a “straight male macho stereotype.”In Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia, Gerald Bostock, a gay man who worked as a Child Welfare Services Coordinator for the Clayton County Juvenile Court System, was fired after Clayton County learned of his sexual orientation, his participation in a gay recreational softball...

25 MIN2019 NOV 1
Comments
Sexual Orientation Consolidated - Post-Argument SCOTUScast

Latest Episodes

Peter v. NantKwest Inc. Post-Decision SCOTUScast

On Dec 11, 2019 the Supreme Court decided Peter v. NantKwest Inc., a case considering whether a party opting to bring a challenge in federal district court to an adverse decision of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office’s (PTO) Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) must pay the PTO’s resulting attorney’s fees. When a patent applicant is rejected by the PTO, and the PTAB affirms that decision on appeal, the aggrieved applicant may either pursue further (but relatively constrained) review in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit--or the applicant may file a more expansive challenge in federal district court. The latter option is authorized by 35 U.S.C. § 145, but the statute also provides that “[a]ll the expenses of the proceedings shall be paid by the applicant.”Here, NantKwest challenged an adverse PTAB decision in federal district court, but lost. After the judgment was affirmed by the Federal Circuit, the PTO sought reimbursement of its expenses from NantKwest, inc...

16 MIN2 w ago
Comments
Peter v. NantKwest Inc. Post-Decision SCOTUScast

Monasky v. Taglieri - Post-Argument SCOTUScast

On Dec. 11, 2019, the U.S. Supreme Court heard argument in Monasky v. Taglieri, a case involving the standard of appellate review applicable to determinations of “habitual residence” under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, as well as the conditions under which habitual residence is established for an infant.The Hague Convention, and the federal law that implements it in the United States, indicate that a parent whose child has been removed to another country in violation of that parent’s custodial rights can petition in federal or state court for the return of the child to the child’s country of habitual residence. The courts of that country can then resolve any underlying custody disputes. Petitioner Michelle Monasky, an American, gave birth to her daughter A.M.T. in Italy. Monasky’s husband Domenico Taglieri, who is the father, is Italian. Alleging that Taglieri had become physically abusive, Monasky took the newborn A.M.T. to a domes...

8 MIN2 w ago
Comments
Monasky v. Taglieri - Post-Argument SCOTUScast

Intel Corp. Investment Policy Committee v. Sulyma - Post-Argument SCOTUScast

On Dec. 4, 2019, the U.S. Supreme Court heard argument in Intel Corp. Investment Policy Committee v. Sulyma, a case asking what degree of knowledge of a possible violation is necessary to trigger the three-year statute of limitations provided in the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).Respondent Christopher Sulyma worked for Intel Corporation from 2010-12, and during that time participated in retirement plans governed by ERISA. In 2015, Sulyma brought suit against Intel’s investment policy committee under various provisions of ERISA, alleging that the committee had invested imprudently and failed to make certain disclosures. Intel moved to dismiss the complaint based on ERISA’s statute of limitations, which provides that actions like Sulyma’s may not be commenced more than “three years after the earliest date on which the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the breach or violation.” The district court found that Sulyma had actual knowledge of the alleged violations more than three years before bringing suit, and dismissed the case. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, concluding that Sulyma’s constructive knowledge of the alleged violations did not rise to the level of “actual knowledge” necessary to trigger the statute of limitations. It was not sufficient, the Court determined, that the relevant facts were available to the Sulyma; he had actually to be aware of those facts.The Ninth Circuit’s reasoning on the meaning of “actual knowledge” conflicted with that of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, however, and the Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari to consider whether the ERISA limitations provision bars suit when all the relevant information was disclosed to the plaintiff by the defendants more than three years before the plaintiff filed the complaint, but the plaintiff chose not to read or could not recall having read the information.To discuss the cases, we have Matthew S. Rozen, Associate Attorney at Gibson DunnAs always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.

16 MIN3 w ago
Comments
Intel Corp. Investment Policy Committee v. Sulyma - Post-Argument SCOTUScast

Barton v. Barr Post Argument SCOTUScast

On Nov. 4, 2019, the U.S. Supreme Court heard argument in Barton v. Barr, a case involving a dispute over whether, for the purposes of the “stop-time rule,” a lawfully admitted permanent resident who is not seeking admission to the United States can be “render[ed] ... inadmissible”. The stop-time rule affects the discretion afforded the U.S. Attorney General to cancel the removal from the United States of a lawful permanent resident who has resided in the U.S. continuously for 7 years. Under the stop-time rule, the requisite continuous residence terminates once the alien commits any of a certain number of offenses that render the alien inadmissible to (or removable from) the United States under federal law. Thus, committing a listed offense may cause an alien to fall short of the continuous 7-year residence requirement and thereby become ineligible for cancellation of removal.Andre Martello Barton, after receiving lawful permanent resident status, was convicted in 1996 on three counts of aggravated assault, one count of criminal damage to property, and one count of firearm possession during the commission of a felony, all in violation of state law. In 2007 and 2008, he was also convicted of several state law drug offenses. The federal government then initiated proceedings to remove Barton based on his various convictions. He conceded removability on the basis of his controlled substance and gun possession offenses but applied for cancellation of removal based on continuous residence. The government argued that Barton’s 1996 convictions triggered the stop-time rule, thereby disqualifying him for cancellation of removal. The Immigration Judge ruled in favor of the government and the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. Barton then petitioned for relief from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, which rejected his argument that the stop-time rule only applies to aliens seeking admission to the United States, and therefore denied his petition.The Eleventh Circuit recognized that the federal circuit courts of appeals have split on the issue, however, and the Supreme Court ultimately granted certiorari to address whether a lawfully admitted permanent resident who is not seeking admission to the United States can be “render[ed] ... inadmissible” for the purposes of the stop-time rule.To discuss the case, we have Amy Moore, Associate Professor of Law at Belmont University College of Law.As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.

12 MINJAN 27
Comments
Barton v. Barr Post Argument SCOTUScast

Kansas v. Garcia - Post-Argument SCOTUScast

On Oct. 16, 2019, the U.S. Supreme Court heard argument in Kansas v. Garcia, a case involving a dispute over whether the federal Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) precludes states from using any information contained in a federal Form I-9, (which includes common information such as name, date of birth, and social security number) to prosecute the person with a state crime.Respondents Ramiro Garcia, Donaldo Morales, and Guadalupe Ochoa-Lara were convicted of identity theft (and/or making a false information) by the state of Kansas, for using social security numbers that were not theirs on federally required employment or housing-related paperwork. Respondents argued that their convictions were invalid on the grounds that IRCA preempts the use of such information in a state prosecution. The Kansas Supreme Court agreed and reversed the convictions, holding that IRCA expressly preempted state prosecutions that use information contained in a federal I-9 form. That decision conflicted with those of various other state supreme courts and federal circuit courts of appeals, however, and the U.S. Supreme Court subsequently granted Kansas’s certiorari petition to address whether IRCA impliedly preempts Kansas’ prosecution of respondents.To discuss the cases, we have Jonathan Urick senior counsel for litigation at the U.S. Chamber Litigation Center.As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.

27 MINJAN 10
Comments
Kansas v. Garcia - Post-Argument SCOTUScast

Allen v. Cooper - Post-Argument SCOTUScast

On Nov. 5, 2019, the U.S. Supreme Court heard argument in Allen v. Cooper, which involves a dispute over the way state sovereign immunity and federal copyright law interact when an author alleges state infringement of that author’s federal copyright.Petitioner Frederick Allen and his company, Nautilus Productions, contend that North Carolina violated their federal copyrights by publishing video and photographic footage that Allen had taken of the pirate Blackbeard’s sunken flagship, Queen Anne’s Revenge. Allen also challenges the validity of a recently passed North Carolina statute providing that photographs and video recordings of shipwrecks in the custody of North Carolina are public records. This law, he contends, was enacted in bad faith to undermine his copyright claim.Allen and Nautilus sued North Carolina and various of its officials in federal district court. Although the district court rejected defendants’ invocation of sovereign immunity from suit, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed that judgment, concluding that the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act does not validly abrogate Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity, which ultimately shields respondents from all of Allen’s and Nautilus’s claims.The U.S. Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari to consider whether Congress validly abrogated state sovereign immunity via the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act in providing remedies for authors of original expression whose federal copyrights are infringed by states.To discuss the case, in this special panel episode, we have Zvi Rosen, Visiting Scholar and Professorial Lecturer in Law, George Washington University School of Law, Prof. Josh Blackman, Associate Professor of Law, South Texas College of Law Houston, and our moderator, Kevin R. Amer, Deputy General Counsel at the U.S. Copyright Office.As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.

41 MIN2019 NOV 23
Comments
Allen v. Cooper - Post-Argument SCOTUScast

County of Maui, Hawaii v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund - Post-Argument SCOTUScast

On Nov 6, 2019, the U.S. Supreme Court heard County of Maui, Hawai’i v. Hawai’i Wildlife Fund, which involves a dispute over whether the Clean Water Act’s permit requirement applies when pollutants originate from a concrete point but are only conveyed to navigable waters indirectly, via groundwater.Under the federal Clean Water Act (CWA), someone seeking to discharge a pollutant from a “point source,” such as a pipe or well, into navigable water must first obtain a permit via the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System program (NPDES). The County of Maui, Hawai’i (the County), owns and operates four wells at a wastewater treatment plant that processes several million gallons of sewage per day. Treated wastewater from the plant is injected into groundwater via these wells, and some ultimately enter the Pacific Ocean via submarine seeps.Hawai’i Wildlife Fund and various other organizations filed suit against the County, alleging that it was violating the CWA by discharging effluent through groundwater into the ocean without an NDPES permit. The district court agreed with the plaintiffs and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, rejecting the County’s argument that no violation occurred because the pollutants did not issue directly from the point source (the wells) into navigable water (the ocean), but rather traveled indirectly to the ocean via groundwater. The Ninth Circuit’s reading sharpened a split among the federal circuit courts of appeals on the proper interpretation of the CWA, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to address whether the CWA requires a permit “when pollutants originate from a point source but are conveyed to navigable waters by a nonpoint source, such as groundwater.” To discuss the cases, we have Glenn Roper, attorney at the Pacific Legal Foundation.As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.

26 MIN2019 NOV 14
Comments
County of Maui, Hawaii v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund - Post-Argument SCOTUScast

Kansas v. Glover - Post-Argument SCOTUScast

On Nov. 4, 2019, the U.S. Supreme Court heard argument in Kansas v. Glover, a case involving a dispute over the “reasonable suspicion” necessary to justify a traffic stop when the registered owner of a vehicle has a revoked license but the actual driver of the vehicle has not been identified.A county sheriff’s deputy pulled over Charles Glover, Jr. after running a registration check on the vehicle Glover was driving and finding that the registered owner had a revoked license. Although Glover was, in fact, the registered owner, the deputy did not attempt to confirm his identity before making the stop; nor did he witness any traffic violations. The deputy had simply assumed the registered owner was the person driving the vehicle. Glover moved to suppress evidence obtained during the traffic stop, arguing that the officer had lacked the requisite “reasonable suspicion” of illegal activity to authorize the stop. The Kansas Supreme Court ultimately agreed with Glover, holding that the officer “lacked an articulable and reasonable suspicion that the unidentified driver did not have a valid driver's license.” This decision conflicted with those of various other state supreme courts and federal circuit courts of appeals on similar questions, and the U.S. Supreme Court subsequently granted Kansas’s certiorari petition to consider whether, for purposes of an investigative stop under the Fourth Amendment, it is reasonable for an officer to suspect that the registered owner of a vehicle is the one driving the vehicle absent any information to the contrary.To discuss the cases, we have Brian Fish, Special Assistant, United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland.As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.

20 MIN2019 NOV 13
Comments
Kansas v. Glover - Post-Argument SCOTUScast

Mathena v. Malvo - Post-Argument SCOTUScast

On October 16, 2019, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Mathena v. Malvo, a case which concerns the scope of a new constitutional rule when applied retroactively on collateral review.In 2004, respondent Lee Boyd Malvo was convicted in Virginia on various counts of capital murder due to his participation in the “DC Sniper” attacks of 2002. As he was 17 years old at the time, he avoided the death penalty and was sentenced to four terms of life imprisonment without parole. In 2012, the Supreme Court held in Miller v. Alabama that sentencing a person younger than 18 to mandatory life imprisonment without parole violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments. In 2016, the Court then held in Montgomery v. Louisiana that Miller had announced a new substantive rule applicable retroactively in cases on state collateral review.When Malvo raised these issues on collateral review, the Fourth Circuit held that his sentences of life without parole must be va...

11 MIN2019 NOV 2
Comments
Mathena v. Malvo - Post-Argument SCOTUScast

Sexual Orientation Consolidated - Post-Argument SCOTUScast

On October 8, 2019, the U.S. Supreme Court heard argument in two consolidated cases asking whether discrimination “because of … sex,” which is prohibited by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, includes discrimination based on sexual orientation.In Altitude Express, Inc. v. Zarda, gay skydiving instructor Donald Zarda was fired after a female client with whom he was preparing a tandem jump alleged that he had touched her inappropriately, though he had disclosed his sexual orientation to protest that his intentions were not sexual. His lawsuit alleged that his employer discriminated against him because he was honest about his sexual orientation and did not conform to a “straight male macho stereotype.”In Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia, Gerald Bostock, a gay man who worked as a Child Welfare Services Coordinator for the Clayton County Juvenile Court System, was fired after Clayton County learned of his sexual orientation, his participation in a gay recreational softball...

25 MIN2019 NOV 1
Comments
Sexual Orientation Consolidated - Post-Argument SCOTUScast
hmly
himalayaプレミアムへようこそ聴き放題のオーディオブックをお楽しみください。